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Abstract
We ﬁnd that ﬁrms behave remarkably similarly to how their CEOs behave personally when it comes to leverage
choices. We start our analysis by compiling a comprehensive sample of home purchases and ﬁnancings among
S&P 1,500 CEOs. Debt ﬁnancing in a CEO’s most recent home purchase is used as a revealed preference of
the CEO’s personal attitude towards debt. We ﬁnd a robust positive relation between personal and corporate
leverage. We also ﬁnd that ﬁrms tend to hire CEOs with a similar personal attitude towards debt as the
previous CEO. When the new and previous CEOs have diﬀerent personal preferences, corporate leverage
changes in the direction of the new CEO’s personal leverage. These results support a model with endogenous
matching of CEOs to ﬁrms. We also ﬁnd that the positive relation between CEOs’ personal leverage and
corporate leverage is stronger in ﬁrms with poor governance, suggesting that CEOs imprint their personal
preferences on the ﬁrms they manage when they are able to do so. These results suggest that heterogeneity
in CEOs’ personal attitudes towards debt partly explains diﬀerences in corporate capital structures, and
suggest more generally that an analysis of CEOs’ personalities and personal traits may provide important
information about the ﬁnancial policies of the ﬁrms they manage.
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Volk for outstanding research assistance and Rudi Fahlenbrach for providing data on founder CEOs. Cronqvist is
thankful for research support provided by the Financial Economics Institute (FEI) at Claremont McKenna College.I Introduction
Since the beginning of modern capital structure research (Modigliani and Miller, 1958), ﬁnancial
economists have devoted signiﬁcant eﬀort to analyzing the determinants of corporate ﬁnancing
policies. The focus of most empirical work has been on examining whether market-, industry-,
and/or ﬁrm-level characteristics can systematically explain corporations’ leverage choices. Examples
of ﬁrm characteristics that have been studied extensively are taxes, transactions costs, agency costs,
and costs of ﬁnancial distress.1 However, there has been less focus in the corporate ﬁnance literature
on the eﬀects of personal characteristics, such as the speciﬁc traits and the personality of a ﬁrm’s
top-executive, the Chief Executive Oﬃcer (CEO).
Many empirical studies assume, at least implicitly, that the traits of a ﬁrm’s CEO are not
important for corporate capital structure decisions. One possibility is that CEOs tend to be more
or less homogenous in terms of characteristics that may matter for capital structure choices of ﬁrms
if it takes a certain type of person to rise to the top of a ﬁrm. CEOs are then perfect substitutes for
one another, and for this reason, their speciﬁc traits do not matter. Another possibility is that there
may exist real heterogeneity between CEOs, for example, in their personal preferences or personal
attitude towards debt and ﬁnancial leverage. But these diﬀerences may not translate into eﬀects
on ﬁrms’ capital structures if a single CEO can not impact such policies, or corporate governance
structures eﬀectively restrain CEOs from imprinting their personal preferences on the ﬁrms they
manage. In either case, the prediction is that ﬁrms in the same industry with similar ﬁrm-level
characteristics will choose similar capital structures despite being managed by diﬀerent CEOs.
The hypothesis we set out to analyze empirically in this paper is that the speciﬁc personal traits
of CEOs matter for corporate capital structure decisions. We base such a hypothesis on recent
empirical evidence and discussion in corporate ﬁnance research. For example, in an extensive review
of empirical papers, Parsons and Titman (2007) argue that there exist several diﬃcult to measure
1A number of ﬁrm-level characteristics have been found to be signiﬁcantly related to corporate capital structures.
Frank and Goyal (2007a) study the leverage decisions of U.S. public ﬁrms for the period 1950 to 2003, and ﬁnd that
the most important ﬁrm characteristics are median industry leverage, market-to-book ratio, ﬁrm size, proﬁtability,
tangibility, and expected inﬂation. Graham and Harvey (2001) use survey data to study capital structure decisions.
They also focus on characteristics at the ﬁrm-level but note that some models, such as agency models, may not be
examined using a survey research methodology.
1CEO characteristics which may impact capital structures, including “managerial preferences” (p.
24). Some studies show that CEOs are key to understand corporate decision-making.2 For example,
Bertrand and Schoar (2003) document signiﬁcant CEO ﬁxed eﬀects in a set of corporate policies,
such as capital structure decisions, and argue that such eﬀects may represent heterogeneity in
“preferences, risk aversion” (p. 1174). However, we are not aware of any empirical analysis speciﬁcally
on a relation between CEOs’ attitudes towards debt and capital structures in the ﬁrms which these
CEOs manage. Recent papers which have analyzed CEO characteristics (e.g., Frank and Goyal
(2007b) and Graham et al. (2008)) have examined important characteristics but not the eﬀect of
CEOs’ personal attitude towards ﬁnancial leverage.3
In this paper, we will attempt to measure the personal attitude towards ﬁnancial leverage in
the cross-section of CEOs and then relate those personal preferences to ﬁrms’ capital structure
decisions. It is extremely diﬃcult to measure or otherwise elicit CEOs’ attitudes without the ability
to perform experiments with our sample of CEOs as subjects. We therefore propose the use of
CEOs’ debt ratios, i.e., their mortgage to purchase price ratios in their most recent purchase of a
primary residence, as a revealed preference of their personal attitude towards debt. We consider
this to be a reasonable approach for several reasons. First, it is a “revealed preference approach”
to elicit CEOs’ personal attitudes towards ﬁnancial leverage.4 Second, the personal preference
we attempt to elicit comes from the same domain (ﬁnancial decision-making) as the policy we
analyze, corporate leverage. Finally, a primary residence purchase is an important decision for many
CEOs, and the mortgage is likely the most important source of debt for many CEOs. Based on
the above, we hypothesize that a CEO’s personal home leverage may tell us something about the
CEO’s personality, and speciﬁcally, how comfortable the CEO is with ﬁnancial leverage and how
conservative he is when it comes to ﬁnancial decision-making.
2For a recent overview of research on CEOs, we refer to Bertrand (2009).
3We have referenced several empirical studies, but it is worth noting that we are not aware of much theoretical work
which incorporates heterogeneity in CEOs’ personal traits into a model of corporate capital structure decisions. Two
exceptions are Cadenillas, Cvitani´ c, and Zapatero (2004) and Hackbarth (2008). Cadenillas, Cvitani´ c, and Zapatero
model the relations between managerial risk aversion, leverage, and CEO compensation contracts. In Hackbarth, the
CEO characteristic which is modeled is optimism or overconﬁdence, traits which we do not measure in this paper.
4Other researchers have previously measured speciﬁc traits of CEOs also using a revealed preferences approach. For
example, Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008) measure CEO overconﬁdence by examining whether CEOs persistently
choose not to exercise in-the-money call options on their own company stock.
2Why then may we expect personal and corporate leverage to be related? One possibility, which
we call the “hedging” view, is that CEOs with more personal home leverage prefer lower corporate
leverage to countervail their high personal ﬁnancial risk in their overall portfolio. Such an eﬀect
assumes that excessive corporate leverage is not costless for the CEO personally. Corporate ﬁnancial
distress may be costly if the CEO loses his job and ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital investment, and
there are frictions in the the labor market for executives.5 These arguments predict an inverse
relation between personal CEO leverage and the ﬁnancial leverage in the capital structure of the
ﬁrm which the executive manages, as the CEO considers corporate as well as personal leverage
when making decisions.
Another possibility is that CEOs (and any other individual for that matter) possess individual-
speciﬁc personal preferences regarding ﬁnancial leverage and debt, and there is heterogeneity in
these attitudes across CEOs. That is, some prefer more ﬁnancial risk while others prefer less.6
As a result, CEOs may diﬀer in their “match quality” with ﬁrms, and CEOs who have a higher
propensity to bear ﬁnancial risk are, in such a model, expected to match in equilibrium with ﬁrms
that have higher leverage. Alternatively, a speciﬁc debt preference steers both CEOs’ personal
and corporate leverage decisions in the same direction, so that those who prefer more leverage
personally are expected to manage ﬁrms with more aggressive capital structures, and vice versa.7
These arguments predict a positive relation between personal and corporate leverage.
We start our empirical analysis by following Liu and Yermack (2007) in constructing a database
with detailed information on CEOs’ primary residences and their mortgages. Liu and Yermack ﬁnd
that ﬁrm performance deteriorates when CEOs acquire extremely large properties, but they do not
5For evidence on costs of ﬁnancial distress for ﬁrms, see, e.g., Warner (1977) and Andrade and Kaplan (1998),
and see Weisbach (1988) and Warner et al. (1988), for example for evidence of high CEO turnover among ﬁnancially
distressed ﬁrms.
6Where would such heterogeneity in attitudes towards ﬁnancial leverage come from? While an interesting research
question which we want to address in future work, it is beyond the scope of the current paper. In this paper, we may
only speculate – based on existing research – that prior experience is one determinant. For example, Graham and
Narasimhan (2004) ﬁnd that CEOs’ professional (and perhaps also personal) experiences during the Great Depression
aﬀected their ﬁrms’ capital structures in the following decade. Malmendier and Nagel (2007) report that an individual’s
experience of a macro-economic shock may aﬀect risk-taking decades later.
7The pursuit of leverage with similar aggressiveness in the personal and corporate domain may arise from a desire
to avoid cognitive dissonance. Cognitive Dissonance Theory is a well-established theory in psychology about the
discomfort individuals feel when “having opinions that do not ﬁt other opinions that they have” (Festinger, 1957, p.
4).
3analyze the eﬀects of the ﬁnancing of these homes on corporate capital structures. Our sample
consists of S&P 1,500 ﬁrms. The personal leverage data are hand-collected from LexisNexis and
public records on county assessor, auditor, and recorder websites. We ﬁnd that 67 percent of the
CEOs use a mortgage at the time of the home purchase. Conditional on using a mortgage, the
median mortgage to purchase price ratio is 66 percent. Importantly, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant heterogeneity
in personal leverage across CEOs: the range is from 0 to 100 percent home leverage and the standard
deviation is 34 percent. Some CEOs are found to be much more comfortable with personal ﬁnancial
leverage compared to others, even when controlling for important economic determinants of home
leverage, such as the geographic region of the home or interest rates at the time of the purchase.
We regress corporate leverage on personal leverage, and ﬁnd a positive and statistically signiﬁcant
relation. The economic magnitude of the estimated eﬀects is large. Suppose we compare two CEOs,
one with the median personal leverage, measured by the mortgage to purchase price ratio in the
most recent home purchase, and one with a one standard deviation lower home leverage. The
diﬀerence in corporate leverage is about 2.4 percentage points. Because the median (market-based)
corporate leverage ratio is 12 percent in our sample, this translates into a 20 percent lower corporate
leverage. We also show that the presumably most conservative CEOs, i.e., those who are found to
“never lever” (at the time of the home purchase or any other time), have 4.2 percentage points lower
corporate leverage. We show in the paper that these basic results are robust to an extensive set of
controls and robustness checks.
Why are personal and corporate leverage positively related? We examine several possibilities,
and ﬁnd support for two explanations. First, we consider an explanation based on sorting and
endogenous matching of CEOs to ﬁrms. We analyze CEO changes and subsequent corporate
leverage changes. When we regress a new CEO’s personal leverage on the previous CEO’s personal
leverage, we ﬁnd a positive and statistically signiﬁcant relation. This result is suggestive of an
endogenous CEO-ﬁrm matching explanation in which a ﬁrm’s board tends to replace a CEO with a
speciﬁc personal attitude towards ﬁnancial leverage with a new, similar CEO. Explanations for such
matching include eﬃcient risk allocation such that CEOs who are willing to bear more ﬁnancial
risk match better with ﬁrms for which higher leverage is optimal. While statistically signiﬁcant,
4the correlation is far from one, meaning that sometimes ﬁrms select a new CEO with diﬀerent
personal leverage than the previous CEO. When we regress changes in corporate leverage on changes
in personal leverage and control variables, we ﬁnd a positive and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect.
That is, ﬁrms change corporate leverage in a way that is, in part, predicted by the diﬀerence in
personal leverage between the new and previous CEOs. So, when the new CEO is more ﬁnancially
conservative based on his personal leverage, we ﬁnd that the ﬁrm tends to reduce its corporate
leverage. It is of course possible that the new CEO was selected precisely to change the ﬁrm’s
capital structure in this direction.
Second, the positive relation between personal and corporate leverage may be explained by
CEOs imprinting their personal preferences on the capital structures of the ﬁrms they manage, even
if not optimal for the value of the ﬁrm. If CEOs imprint their personal preferences, governance
may play an important role. Speciﬁcally, we expect that in poorly governed ﬁrms, CEOs most
easily imprint their personal preferences. We analyze three measures of governance: the percentage
incentive-based pay, board size as a measure of board governance, and the G-index. We ﬁnd that the
positive relation between CEOs’ personal leverage and corporate leverage is signiﬁcantly stronger in
ﬁrms with poor governance using two of these three measures. These results suggest that matching
of CEOs to ﬁrms is not the only explanation for the positive relation between personal leverage and
corporate leverage.
Our paper is related to the previously mentioned research and several other empirical studies.
First, existing evidence suggests that when CEOs have more discretion over their ﬁrms’ capital
structures and are more poorly governed, they tend to prefer lower corporate leverage (e.g., Berger
et al. (1997)). Executives may prefer less leverage than optimal because they prefer to reduce ﬁrm
risk to protect their undiversiﬁed human capital (Fama, 1980). Conversely, Harris and Raviv (1988)
and Stulz (1988) have suggested that CEOs may prefer to increase corporate leverage above the
optimum, in order to increase their control and fend oﬀ takeovers. Our results show that there is
signiﬁcant heterogeneity in the cross-section of CEOs. Some CEOs prefer lower ﬁnancial leverage,
but others have a high tolerance for debt, both personally and in the ﬁrms they manage. That
is, CEOs who are poorly governed may not necessarily reduce corporate leverage, but the CEO’s
5speciﬁc personal attitude towards ﬁnancial leverage seems to matter. Our paper is also related to
recent studies which have focused on personal traits other than personal attitude towards debt, e.g.,
CEO overconﬁdence. Ben-David et al. (2006) ﬁnd that ﬁrms with overconﬁdent CEOs (based on
surveys) use more long-term debt in their ﬁrms’ capital structures.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe the construction of
our new database of CEOs’ primary residences and personal leverage. In Section III, we study
the relation between personal CEO leverage and corporate leverage. In Section IV, we analyze
CEO changes and changes in corporate leverage. In Section V, we explore what may explain the
signiﬁcant relation between personal and corporate leverage. Section VI concludes.
II The Personal Leverage of CEOs in the U.S.
In this section, we describe the construction of a new database of CEOs’ primary residences and
mortgages. We report summary statistics for CEO home characteristics and personal leverage.
Finally, we estimate an empirical model of the economic determinants of personal leverage among
CEOs of large U.S. ﬁrms.
A Sample Construction
We construct a database with detailed information on CEOs’ primary residences and mortgages.8
Our starting point is all CEOs of the largest U.S. ﬁrms – the S&P 1,500 set of ﬁrms – in 2004. We
choose the year 2004 because it is recent enough that there is reasonable coverage by our primary
source of data (see below for details). We identify the CEOs using Standard and Poor’s ExecuComp
database. In total, there are 1,699 CEOs since the index was revised during the year by replacing
some 199 ﬁrms. As is standard in empirical research on capital structures, we drop all ﬁnancial
and utility ﬁrms (SIC codes 4813, 4911, 4931, 6020, 6311, and 6331) as they are subject to capital
8In this paper, we focus on CEOs, and not CFOs, because it is costly to collect data on all executives. CFOs report
to CEOs, not vice versa, so CEOs sign oﬀ on important capital structure decisions. That is, a CFO’s proposed action
is by deﬁnition ﬁltered through the CEO. CEOs who are more directly involved in ﬁnancing decisions may simply
direct CFOs to implement their speciﬁc capital structure choice. CEOs may also hire their “likes” as their CFOs.
Finally, as shown by Chava and Purnanandam (2009), it is possible that CEOs matter for capital structure choices,
while CFOs may matter relatively more for, e.g., debt-maturity decisions, which we do not analyze in this paper.
6structure regulations (339 ﬁrms). We also drop nine ﬁrms headquartered outside the U.S. because
of lack of real estate data. This results in a sample of 1,351 CEOs.
Data availability for the personal leverage and mortgage variables varies somewhat across states,
and to a smaller extent across counties within a state. The following states do not provide public
records of mortgages or other key variables (e.g., purchase price) required for the computation of
our personal leverage measure: Alaska, Delaware, Iowa, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine,
Minnesota, Missouri, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Nevada, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, and Wisconsin. Included in our sample are states that closely resemble
the excluded ones in terms of real estate prices and we also estimate a model with state ﬁxed eﬀects.
As a result of data unavailability, the sample is reduced to 942 CEOs.
We hand-collect data on these CEOs’ primary residences and mortgages using several data
sources and following Liu and Yermack (2007). We use mainly the Nexis online database of public
records, www.nexis.com/research. In this database, we are able to search tax assessment, deed
transfer, and mortgage records for each of the CEOs in our sample. In a select few cases, we have
supplemented the data from Nexis by searching various county assessor, auditor, and recorder
websites. We now describe this search and sample construction process in more detail.
For each CEO, we start by performing a name search using the ﬁrst name, middle initial, and
last name from the ExecuComp database. We restrict this search to individuals with age +/– 1 year
of the CEO’s age because some of them have common ﬁrst and last names, such as Gary B. Smith,
the CEO of Ciena Corp. The vast majority of the CEOs and their residences were identiﬁed in this
straightforward way. In a few cases where there are several individuals with exactly the same name
and age, we use SEC ﬁlings and voter registration records to try to identify the CEO’s home.9
For estate planning, tax, or other reasons, sometimes a trust is recorded as owner of the CEO’s
home. When the trust has a diﬀerent name than the CEO, he or his spouse are recorded as sellers
of the property or as trustees and thus are still in the database. In addition, listed on some records
may be the name of the CEO’s spouse, commonly with the label “Husband and Wife.” Spousal
names may in some cases be found in the ﬁrm’s SEC ﬁlings. Additional records are in some cases
9There are eight CEOs with the last name “Smith” in our sample. We are able to identify the primary residence
for six of them.
7located through a search based on these trust or spousal names.
We focus on a CEO’s primary residence, as it constitutes the vast majority of most CEOs’ real
estate holdings. In many cases, the primary residence is listed as “Owner Occupied.” Listed on
all records is the mailing address for tax purposes, which is often the CEO’s primary residence
address (but it may also be the address of the corporate headquarters). When CEOs own multiple
homes in the area of the corporate headquarters, we classify the largest property as the primary
residence if we do not ﬁnd information from other data sources suggesting otherwise. By their
speciﬁc location, some homes are determined to be recreation homes or the like, such as a golf
community condominium in Hawaii for a California-based CEO. By reviewing all the records for a
CEO, we are able to determine the primary residence of 709 CEOs (75.3% of the sample).
Once all primary residence and mortgage records are located, we collect data on the purchase price
of each CEO’s most recent primary home, as well as details regarding mortgages and reﬁnancings.10
In addition, we record characteristics of the homes (e.g., the number of bedrooms). When available,
we record the loan type and the mortgage rate. In addition, we supplement these data with estimated
current market values of the homes from Zillow, www.zillow.com.
B Summary Statistics: CEO Home Characteristics
Table I reports descriptive statistics for our database of CEOs’ primary residences. In Panel A,
the number of observations (N) varies across variables because property records are sometimes
incomplete and vary by county. We ﬁnd that the median CEO home is large at 5,180 square feet and
was built on 1.1 acres of land in 1989.11 There is, however, signiﬁcant variation in home size because
the standard deviation is 2,800 sq. ft. Some CEOs prefer signiﬁcantly larger homes compared to
others. For example, one CEO resides in a 22,371 square feet home, a measure which does not
include three additional smaller houses or servants’ quarters on the estate, nor a 24,000 square feet
indoor pool. The median CEO home has 11 rooms, whereof four are bedrooms, and in addition,
10We recorded executive loans from the company, but found them to be very rare in our sample, probably because
Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) bans such loans to CEOs. From the 477 pre-2002 CEO home purchases, we identify only ﬁve
such loans.
11We coded condominiums as having zero land size and they are not included in the land size statistics. Land sizes
close to zero are townhouses.
8there are ﬁve bathrooms. All of the distributions of house size or estimated market values are found
to be skewed to the right.
The table also reports data on purchase prices and estimated market values. The median CEO
purchase price is $1.651 million in 2005 home price dollars. The purchase prices have been adjusted
using the Oﬃce of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight’s National Home Price Index. Current
market values are very diﬃcult to estimate without actual real estate transactions for the properties,
in particular for high-priced CEO homes for which the market is illiquid and there are not many
reasonable benchmark transactions. Based on assessment records, the market value of the median
CEO home is $1.480 million in 2005 dollars.12 Based on Zillow’s “Zestimates,” the market value of
the median CEO home is $1.679 million. The highest estimated market value in our sample is $43.6
million from assessment records, and $39.1 million from Zillow.
In the last column of the table, we also compare the CEO homes to those of the median U.S.
household based on data from the Bureau of Census 2005 American Community Survey. These data
show that the median home in the U.S. has ﬁve rooms, whereof three are bedrooms. At the median,
these homes are 14 years older (built in 1975) than a CEO’s primary residence. In addition, we ﬁnd
that there is an almost 10-fold diﬀerence in the median market value based on assessment records:
$1.48 million for CEOs versus $168,000 for the U.S. overall, in 2005 house price dollars. Though
large, proportionately this diﬀerence is smaller than the pay diﬀerence between the groups. Kaplan
and Rauh (2007) report that the median total compensation in 2004 for CEOs of non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms
was $2.54 million. This is nearly 57 times the $44,684 U.S. median household income reported by
the 2004 American Community Survey.
Panel B of Table I shows that only 10.2 percent of the CEO homes are new constructions homes.
These observations are more complicated when it comes to determining the purchase price for the
home in addition to the land. But this statistic shows that this potential problem is relatively
uncommon in our sample. For new construction homes, we use as the purchase price, the cost of the
land plus the “construction cost,” when available, and otherwise the “improvement value” as stated
12The median market value from assessment records is lower than the median purchase price, both reported in 2005
home price dollars. One reason for this is that, because of data availability, we are comparing two diﬀerent subsamples.
Also, tax assessments are often lower than actual market values.
9in assessment records. Not surprisingly, we ﬁnd that 89.0 percent (5.6 percent) of the CEOs reside in
the state (neighboring state) of their ﬁrm’s corporate headquarters, probably because of signiﬁcant
diseconomies of living far away.13 In a few cases, the CEO’s primary residence is thousands of miles
from the corporate headquarters, such as one California-based CEO with a primary residence on
the East Coast. We assume that these are cases where the CEO is reluctant to relocate the family
at the start of his tenure, or he resides in close geographical proximity to the ﬁrm’s marketing and
sales organization.
C Summary Statistics: CEO Home Leverage
With the objective of measuring personal tolerance for ﬁnancial leverage in mind, we compute the
leverage which each CEO uses in the purchase of his most recent primary residence. Speciﬁcally,
HomeLev is the sum of the primary and secondary mortgage liens, at the time of the home purchase,
scaled by the purchase price.14 In the real estate literature, HomeLev is commonly referred to as
the combined loan-to-value (LTV) ratio.15
One problem caused by data unavailability is that the nonexistence of a mortgage record results
in HomeLev = 0, though the reason could be: (i) that no mortgage was used; or (ii) missing data.
To try to include the former but exclude the latter, we require the purchase price to be available
for an observation to remain in the sample. Because it is diﬃcult to determine the purchase price
of new construction homes, we drop these observations for HomeLev, but we include them for
measures of home leverage that do not require a measure of the purchase price (e.g., whether the
CEO has a mortgage or not). In cases of intra-family real estate transactions, we search the Nexis
database until we ﬁnd an arms-length transaction and calculate HomeLev based on that.
13These numbers may be somewhat upwardly biased because one reason for not being able to deﬁnitively identify a
CEO and include him in our sample is that he resides very far from the ﬁrm’s headquarters.
14There appears to be no way for researchers to reliably measure CEOs’ personal leverage other than mortgages
and home equity loans/lines using U.S. data. However, these sources are likely the most common sources of debt
because the interest rate is lower than for uncollateralized loans such as credit card debt, and mortgages are also
special in that they come with interest deductability and thus should to be used as the ﬁrst source of debt.
15The data on speciﬁcs on the mortgages are incomplete or not available, e.g., whether the mortgage was an
adjustable-rate mortgages (ARM), subprime, ALT-A mortgage, or the name of the bank which provided the mortgage.
For example, we have data on ARMs for only 292 executives. We also have not cross-checked our database with
HMDA or LPS/McDash data to examine whether the banks retain CEO mortgages in their portfolios or sold them in
the secondary market.
10Table II reports summary statistics for CEO home leverage. Panel A shows that the unconditional
median HomeLev is 48 percent. However, we ﬁnd a range from 0 to 100 percent leverage (i.e., no
down-payment at all on the home).16 Also, the variation, as measured by the standard deviation, is
very large at 34 percent. Conditional on having a mortgage, we ﬁnd that the median CEO home
leverage is 66 percent. Somewhat surprisingly, CEOs’ home leverage is only somewhat lower than
the U.S. median, which is 75 percent in 2005, as can be seen in the ﬁnal column of the table. We
also see that the median mortgage of a CEO is $1.066 million, in 2005 home price dollars, while it
is $211,900 overall in the U.S.17
Panel B reports that 67.0 percent of CEOs use a mortgage at the time of the purchase of their
primary residence. We ﬁnd that some CEOs obtain mortgages after the time of the home purchase:
74.8 percent of the CEOs use a mortgage backed by their primary residence at some point in time.
For some CEOs, we ﬁnd forms of home leverage other than mortgages. This debt includes revolving
credit home equity lines/loans or other forms of short-term debt ﬁnancing. The table shows that we
found no evidence of any form of debt ﬁnancing in the search process for 20.7 percent of the CEOs.
We hypothesize that CEOs who “never lever” are particularly averse to the use of ﬁnancial leverage,
and this personal preference may be apparent also in their ﬁrms’ capital structure choices.
D Determinants of CEOs’ Personal Leverage
We now turn to the question of what determines CEOs’ personal leverage. That is, why do some
CEOs use relatively more debt to ﬁnance their primary residence than others? One plausible reason
is a greater personal tolerance for debt and ﬁnancial leverage. However, we also recognize several
other potentially important determinants: CEO characteristics (e.g., age), the geographic region of
the home, the macroeconomic conditions (mortgage rates) at the time of the house purchase, and
tax optimization.
Table III reports results from regressing HomeLev on a set of potential determinants of CEOs’
personal leverage. In column (1), we include the CEO’s age at the time of the home purchase
16In a few cases, mortgage records suggest slightly above 100 percent leverage, presumably for ﬁnancing of home
improvements or closing fees, but we censor the home leverage distribution at 100 percent.
17In 2005, the threshold for ”jumbo” mortgages from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac was $359,650. The vast majority
of the CEO mortgages are jumbo mortgages, so there is not suﬃcient variation in data to analyze.
11(PurAge). We expect a negative coeﬃcient on PurAge because older CEOs are likely to have
accumulated more wealth and need smaller mortgages. In column (2), we include the log of the median
home price in the geographic region (county) where the CEO’s home is located (LnMedHmV al).
We expect that CEOs who reside in regions where residential real estate is relatively more expensive
use more debt, all else equal. In column (3), we include the 30-year ﬁxed mortgage rate at the
time when the CEO purchased the home (MortRate30). We predict an inverse relation between
mortgage ﬁnancing rates and the amount of debt taken on by the executive. In column (4), we
include the 5-year lagged market return prior to the time when the CEO purchased the home
(MktRet5yr). CEOs with more wealth are expected to take on smaller mortgages. In column (5),
we include all of these potential determinants at the same time.18
We ﬁnd support for several of our predictions. First, we ﬁnd that indeed older CEOs use
less leverage in their homes: ten years reduce personal home leverage by about 5.2 percentage
points. Second, we ﬁnd that CEOs in geographic regions with relatively higher real estate prices are
signiﬁcantly more levered in their homes. Where to live is an endogenous choice, but living very
far from the corporate headquarters is associated with signiﬁcant diseconomies for most CEOs, so
executives are commonly constrained to live in the region of the corporate headquarters. That is,
some markets, even for CEOs, require more ﬁnancial leverage. For example, the diﬀerence between
Los Angeles county in California and Cuyahoga county in Ohio implies 7.7 percentage points higher
home leverage. We also ﬁnd that CEOs who purchased their homes when mortgage rates were
relatively low use more leverage: a 100 basis points lower 30-year ﬁxed rate implies about 6.3
percentage points more home leverage, ceteris paribus.19 Finally, we ﬁnd that higher stock market
returns in the past ﬁve years result in use of less leverage by CEOs, about 6.4 percentage point less
leverage for every ten percent value-weighted market returns. That is, CEOs tend to keep their
investments in the stock market after periods of relatively higher returns. The weak explanatory
power (adjusted R2 of less than 10 percent) of the models explored in the table suggests that there is
18Untabulated regressions show that these results do not change if we also include home characteristics (square
footage, land size, purchase price, etc.). But because of the endogenous choice of the size of the home to consume, we
choose not to include such variables in our reported model speciﬁcation.
19This result is robust to using the spread of the 30-year ﬁxed rate above the T-Bill rate or the London Interbank
Oﬀered Rate (LIBOR).
12a signiﬁcant heterogeneity in personal leverage ratios which cannot be explained by these economic
determinants, but which may measure a CEO’s personal and idiosyncratic preference for ﬁnancial
leverage.
For several reasons, it seems unlikely that heterogeneity in home leverage across CEOs is entirely
caused by diﬀerences in personal tax status. First, the tax code in the U.S. allows married (single)
taxpayers to deduct interest on home mortgages up to $1 million ($500,000).20 But out of the
mortgages in our ﬁnal sample, only 10.0 percent are exactly $1 million. Most of the CEOs in our
sample have suﬃciently high incomes to beneﬁt from the maximum interest tax deduction. Still, it
is not the case that CEOs lever up their entire home up to the $1 million. We ﬁnd that only 11.9
percent of the CEOs have 100 percent HomeLev if their home purchase price is below $1 million or
a $1 million mortgage if it is above the tax deductability threshold.21
Second, in column (6) of Table III we control for the ratio of a CEO’s total compensation which
is not tax deferable (TaxIncRatio), i.e., salary and other cash compensation (e.g., bonus) divided
by total compensation. CEOs with a larger proportion of their compensation in the form of non-tax
deferrable income may be expected to use more debt to reduce their taxes, but the estimated
coeﬃcient is close to zero (0.002) and not statistically signiﬁcant. In column (7), we control for the
log of the CEO’s total cash compensation. However, the estimated coeﬃcient on this variable is
negative and statistically signiﬁcant, which seems to be more supportive of a capital constraints
explanation rather than tax optimization.22
E Corporate Leverage Measures and Control Variables
Table IV reports summary statistics for four diﬀerent measures of corporate leverage commonly
used in the corporate ﬁnance literature, as well as ﬁrm-level characteristics that are used in our
analysis as control variables. The leverage variables are measured as of the end of 2004 to match
20For details, see http://www.irs.gov/publications/p936/ar02.html.
21This number increases to 21.1 percent if we assume that CEOs can only borrow 80% of their home value, so that
tax minimizers are CEOs who borrow 80% or more if the purchase price of the home is less than $1,250,000 or those
who borrow exactly $1,000,000 if the purchase price of the home is greater than or equal to $1,250,000.
22The number of observations is reduced by about a third in columns (6) and (7) because we require data on the
CEO’s compensation at the time of the home purchase. In several cases such data are missing because the CEO
purchased the home at a time when the CEO was not a top-executive covered by ExecuComp or before the start date
of the ExecuComp database.
13the CEO sample, and the controls are lagged by one year. These data are from S&P’s Compustat
database. Detailed variable deﬁnitions are available in the Appendix. The number of observations
(N) varies across variables because of data availability.
The ﬁnal column of the table, “ExecuComp MEAN,” is reported as a comparison and shows the
means for all U.S.-based, non-ﬁnancial, and non-utility ﬁrms covered by ExecuComp in 2004. As
can be seen, the diﬀerence in means between our particular sample ﬁrms and the ﬁrms covered in
ExecuComp is very small. Overall, the ﬁrms we analyze in this paper are representative of these
large U.S. ﬁrms when it comes to corporate leverage and ﬁrm characteristics.
III Are Personal and Corporate Leverage Related?
Our analysis so far shows that there is signiﬁcant heterogeneity in personal leverage across CEOs
of large public U.S. ﬁrms and that the ability of economic predictor variables to explain these
diﬀerences is limited. This suggests that something else could be driving diﬀerences in the observed
leverage choices, i.e., variation in individuals’ debt tolerances. In this section, we examine whether
personal leverage is related to corporate leverage.
A Regression Results
Table V reports results from regressing corporate leverage on personal leverage using ordinary
least squares (OLS).23 We use a market-based measure of corporate leverage, the ratio of total
debt to market value of assets (TDM). HomeLev is our measure of CEOs’ personal tolerance for
debt ﬁnancing. In column (1), we ﬁnd that the estimated coeﬃcient on home leverage is positive
(0.0606) and statistically signiﬁcant at the 5%-level (t-statistic = 2.43). We report White (1980)
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors, and we allow for clustering of the standard errors at
the industry-level in this model speciﬁcation and in all other speciﬁcations reported in the paper.
In column (2), we include the following ﬁrm-level characteristics as control variables: the
market-to-book ratio (Mktbk) as a measure of growth opportunities, the log of total assets (Assets)
measuring the size of the ﬁrm, proﬁtability (Profit), and tangibility of the ﬁrm’s assets (Tang)a s
23The results are very similar to those from a Tobit model.
14a measure of collateral. In column (3), we control for industry leverage by including IndustLev, the
median total debt to market value of assets ratio in the ﬁrm’s industry (deﬁned at the 4-digit SIC
code level). In column (4), we include ﬁrm controls and control for industry leverage. Controlling
for ﬁrm characteristics and industry leverage does not aﬀect our result. According to column (4),
which we label our “baseline” model in the rest of the paper, we ﬁnd that the estimated coeﬃcient
on HomeLev is positive (0.0700) and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1%-level (t-statistic = 3.53).
We also note that the ﬁrm-level control variables have the expected signs.24
The relation between personal and corporate leverage is very robust. Frank and Goyal (2007a)
explore the relative importance of a large number of potential ﬁrm controls for leverage choices. As a
result, we include the ones they ﬁnd to be the most reliable as our control variables. These controls
are similar to those used in other empirical analysis of corporate capital structures (e.g., Rajan and
Zingales (1995)). In untabulated regressions, we have also checked that our results are robust to the
inclusion of an extensive set of other variables used in a working paper version of Frank and Goyal.
For example, we included Sales instead of Assets, a diﬀerent collateral measure (inventory plus
net property, plant, and equipment scaled by assets) instead of Tang, and we included Zscore of
Altman (1968). None of these changes to our model speciﬁcation change our results.
We note that some recent research on capital structure decisions suggests that ﬁrms tend to
be relatively slow at rebalancing their capital structures (e.g., Leary and Roberts (2005), Kayhan
and Titman (2007), and Lemmon et al. (2008)). As a result, ﬁrms’ observed leverage levels may be
imprecisely measured. With persistent shocks to capital structures, cross-sectional regressions may
have low power to pick up systematic variation. However, this does not seem to be a problem in our
regressions because the measures of personal leverage as well as the ﬁrm-level characteristics are all
statistically signiﬁcant in the table. That is, however imprecisely measured capital structures are,
we are able to ﬁnd many signiﬁcant capital structure determinants.
In column (5) of Table V, we examine non-linear eﬀects of personal home leverage because it
may be that only the executives with the highest home leverage ﬁnd it optimal to countervail their
personal debt through corporate capital structure decisions. That is, we may ﬁnd an inverse relation
24We also check that our results are robust to dealing with potential outliers by winsorizing the data at the 0.5%-level
in each tail of the distribution.
15between personal and corporate debt, but only for the CEOs who are the most highly levered in
their homes. We choose an 80 percent cutoﬀ because of the norm in the U.S. mortgage industry
related to down payments. CEOs with more than 80 percent personal leverage have chosen to
deviate from the norm and expose themselves to particularly high ﬁnancial risk and may choose to
oﬀset such risk through the ﬁrm’s leverage choices. We deﬁne HL80 as an indicator variable which
equals one if HomeLev > 0.80, and zero otherwise. However, we ﬁnd no evidence of non-linear
eﬀects. This result shows that we ﬁnd no evidence of CEOs attempting to oﬀset their personal
ﬁnancial risk by changing their ﬁrms’ leverage in a countervailing fashion, not even among those
who are the most levered.
One concern is that HomeLev may proxy for regional eﬀects because of a possible systematic
relation between geography, personal, and corporate leverage decisions. Variation in taxes across
states is one example. In column (6), we therefore include state ﬁxed eﬀects in our baseline model.
However, we ﬁnd that controlling for regional diﬀerences does not change our results.25 Related to
geographic variation, we also note that there is evidence in the corporate ﬁnance literature that
rural ﬁrms have somewhat more debt in their capital structures than similar urban ﬁrms, possibly
because of diﬀerences in information asymmetries (e.g., Loughran (2008)). However, for such a result
to explain the CEO home leverage eﬀect, it has to be that CEOs of rural ﬁrms have more mortgage
debt than CEOs of urban ﬁrms, something we consider unlikely given our ﬁndings regarding regional
housing prices and personal leverage in Section II.D.
B Economic Magnitude of the Results
The magnitude of the estimated eﬀect of personal leverage is large. One example which illustrates
this involves the two extreme personal leverage values. A ﬁrm with a CEO with 100 percent home
leverage has a debt ratio which is 7.0 percentage points higher than a similar ﬁrm with a CEO with
zero debt. We may also compare two CEOs, one with the median home leverage in our sample and
another with one standard deviation higher leverage. The estimated diﬀerence in corporate leverage
is about 2.4 percentage points (= 0.070 × 0.34). Given that the median total debt to market value
25We have checked that our results are robust to allowing for clustering of the standard errors at the state-level
based on where the ﬁrm is headquartered rather than industry-level clustering.
16of assets (TDM) ratio is 12 percent in our sample, this means about a 20 percent higher corporate
leverage. As a comparison, a one standard deviation change in ﬁrm size (measured by total assets)
corresponds to about 27 percent higher leverage. The eﬀect of a corresponding market to book
change is similar, and the eﬀect of a proﬁt change is also of this magnitude. Thus, we ﬁnd that the
eﬀect of personal leverage on corporate capital structures is about three-quarters of the size of what
are arguably the three most important ﬁrm-level determinants of ﬁrms’ leverage choices.
Another way to illustrate the economic signiﬁcance of our results is to consider how much
HomeLev adds to the explanatory power of the model for corporate leverage. Untabulated
regressions indicate that personal leverage adds about 1.5 percentage points to the adjusted R2 of
our leverage model, which for our baseline model is 0.421. Not surprisingly, this is less than, e.g.,
industry or ﬁrm size, but interestingly, it is on par with the amount added by proﬁtability, another
important explanatory variable in capital structure choices.
What do our results tell us about the overall eﬀect of CEOs’ personal debt preferences on
corporate capital structures? To address this question we start by computing predicted corporate
capital structures using the baseline model speciﬁcation, with and without HomeLev. We then
compute the absolute value of the diﬀerence between the predicted values from the two models as
a measure of deviations directly related to our proxy for a CEO’s personal tolerance for ﬁnancial
leverage. In Figure I, we report a histogram of the resulting distribution of these deviations. We
ﬁnd that the median is 0.0234, with a range from 0 to 0.0487. That is, because of the eﬀect of
CEOs’ personal debt preferences, the median ﬁrm’s debt ratio deviates about 2.3 percentage points
from the ﬁrm’s debt ratio as predicted by a standard model of capital structure. Given that the
median TDM is 12 percent, this again shows the economic signiﬁcance of our results.
C Eﬀects of Home Purchase Timing
While we measure corporate leverage in the cross-section of ﬁrms in 2004, recall that data availability
allows us to calculate HomeLev only at the time of the CEO’s home purchase. In Figure II, we
report a time-line and a frequency distribution describing when the CEOs in our sample purchased
their homes. We ﬁnd that the median year in the ﬁgure is 1999. Thus, in 2004 the median CEO
17had owned his primary residence for ﬁve years.
In Table VI, we examine if there is a diﬀerential eﬀect of home leverage conditional on when the
CEO purchased the home. In column (1), we examine 274 CEOs who purchased their home more
recently, deﬁned as less than ﬁve years prior to 2004. In column (2), we examine 293 CEOs who
purchased their home more than ﬁve years prior to 2004. We ﬁnd that both estimated coeﬃcients are
positive, 0.0801 and 0.0515. The ﬁrst is signiﬁcant at the 1%-level, while the second is signiﬁcant at
the 10%-level. There are two conclusions which can be drawn from this analysis. First, more recent
home purchase transactions may be more precise estimates of CEOs’ personal tolerance for ﬁnancial
leverage, which can explain the stronger statistical signiﬁcance for the recent purchases. Second,
and most importantly, this evidence reduces concerns that an omitted variable simultaneously
explains both personal and corporate leverage, because it shows that HomeLev, even if measured
more than ﬁve years earlier than corporate leverage, is still positively related to contemporaneous
corporate leverage. Also aﬃrming this, note that HomeLev is collected from diﬀerent past years
while corporate leverage is for 2004 only.
D Evidence from Alternative Measures of Personal Leverage
So far, we have used HomeLev, the mortgage to purchase price ratio, as a measure of a CEO’s
personal tolerance for debt ﬁnancing. One concern with this measure is the particular scaling
(purchase price) used. As a result, we re-estimate our baseline model speciﬁcation using several
alternative measures of a CEO’s tolerance for ﬁnancial leverage. These measures are not scaled by
the purchase price of the home.
In column (1) of Table VII, we include an indicator variable (Mort) which is one if the CEO
uses a mortgage at the time of the purchase of his primary residence, and zero otherwise. We ﬁnd
that the estimated coeﬃcient is positive (0.0399) and signiﬁcant at the 1%-level. That is, ﬁrms with
CEOs with a mortgage have about 4.0 percentage points higher leverage than ﬁrms with CEOs
without a mortgage. In column (2), we include an indicator variable (MortRefi) which is one if the
CEO uses a mortgage at the time of purchase or any other time, and zero otherwise. This eﬀect is
also statistically signiﬁcant at all levels, and somewhat larger (4.4 percentage points). In column (3),
18we include an indicator variable that is one if the CEO never used any mortgage, revolving credit
home equity lines/loans, or other forms of short-term debt home ﬁnancing, and zero otherwise, i.e.,
the CEO “never lever” (NeverLever). This is the subset of CEOs who appear to be the most risk
averse and prefer debt the least. We ﬁnd that the capital structures of ﬁrms of CEOs who never
lever are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent than those who are levered at some point. The diﬀerence is about
4.2 percentage points in terms of market-based debt ratios. These eﬀects are large given a median
leverage of 12 percent among our ﬁrms. In column (4), we include the log of CEO mortgage debt.
We ﬁnd that the estimated coeﬃcient is positive (0.0031) and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1%-level.
That is, more CEO debt is associated with more leverage in the ﬁrm which the CEO manages.
In section II.D, we found several signiﬁcant economic determinants of personal home leverage.
We may therefore regress out these eﬀects from HomeLev prior to relating the residual to corporate
capital structures. Speciﬁcally, we deﬁne HomeLevRes to be the residual from column (5) of Table
III. That is, HomeLevRes is the residual home leverage which is not explained by the CEO’s
age at the time of the home purchase, the log of the median home price in the geographic region
(county) where the CEO’s home is located, the 30-year ﬁxed mortgage rate at the time when the
CEO purchased the home, and the return on the market index during the ﬁve years previous to the
home purchase.26 In column (5) of Table VII, we therefore include HomeLevRes. We ﬁnd that
the estimated coeﬃcient is 0.0806 and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1%-level, which conﬁrms our
previous result.
E Eﬀects of Managerial Characteristics
A concern with our empirical analysis so far is that our measure of personal debt preferences may
be correlated with another CEO characteristic which explains our result. To reduce such concerns,
Table VIII reports our baseline model speciﬁcation with several managerial characteristics included.
In column (1), we include CEO age (Age). This does not aﬀect the magnitude of the estimated
26An example may rationalize this exercise. It may for example be argued that interest rates determine both
personal and corporate leverage (though we note that home leverage is typically not from year 2004, the year for
which we measure corporate leverage). In column (5) of Table III, we regress out the eﬀect of the 30-year ﬁxed rate
on HomeLev. As a result, the HomeLevRes measure is orthogonal to home interest rates. A potential problem with
HomeLevRes is that it is a less transparent measure compared to HomeLev.
19coeﬃcient on home leverage – it is still positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1%-level. In
column (2), we include CEO tenure (Tenure), but the coeﬃcient estimate on HomeLev remains
positive and strongly signiﬁcant.
Another variable of importance is CEO wealth. We expect that wealthier CEOs may be less risk
averse, and thus willing to lever up, both personally and in the companies they manage, because of
the deductability of interest. In the U.S., it is not easy to measure CEO wealth.27 In this paper,
we use two proxies. First, we control for founder-CEO status because founders are generally the
wealthiest CEOs. It is possible that founder-CEOs may tolerate higher leverage in their homes and
also in the ﬁrms they manage, which might explain our results. The data on founders are from
Fahlenbrach (2008) and cover a subset of our sample ﬁrms. In column (3), we include an indicator
variable that is one if the CEO is the ﬁrm’s founder, and zero otherwise (Founder). However,
controlling for founder-CEO status does not reduce the estimated coeﬃcient on HomeLev, and
the coeﬃcient on Founder is negative and signiﬁcant at the 10%-level. That is, our results are
inconsistent with wealthy founder-CEOs being responsible for the main result in this paper.
Second, in column (4) we control for the CEO’s percentage ownership stake in the ﬁrm at the
end of the calendar year in 2003 (PctOwn) because CEOs with larger ownership in their ﬁrms
are likely wealthier than other CEOs. The ownership data are from ExecuComp and total shares
outstanding are from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). However, controlling
for CEO ownership does not reduce the estimated coeﬃcient on HomeLev.28 The coeﬃcient on
PctOwn is positive (0.0728) and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1%-level.
Finally, in column (5) we include several managerial characteristics simultaneously. The eﬀect
of personal leverage remains positive (0.0673) and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1%-level. The
estimated coeﬃcients on the managerial characteristics in the table are generally consistent with
the result in Berger et al. (1997). They show that entrenched CEOs choose capital structures with
less debt. Consistent with such entrenchment eﬀects, we ﬁnd that ﬁrms with founder CEOs have
27Studies which use data on CEO wealth (e.g., Becker (2006)) use data from other countries, such as Sweden, where
the government maintains detailed records of individuals’ wealth for tax reasons. Becker ﬁnds that wealthier CEOs
receive higher incentives from their ﬁrms, a ﬁnding which is consistent with decreasing risk aversion from more wealth.
28As an alternative, we also included the log of the market value of the CEO’s equity holdings in the ﬁrm. The
estimated coeﬃcient on that control variable is not statistically signiﬁcant, and the inclusion does not reduce the
eﬀect of home leverage.
20less debt. We conclude from this evidence that CEO personal leverage measures a key aspect of
ﬁrm behavior which is not captured by other observable managerial characteristics, such as CEO
age, tenure, founder status, or proxies for wealth.
F Eﬀects of Home Characteristics
We reported in section B that there is signiﬁcant heterogeneity across CEOs in terms of housing
consumption. Anecdotal evidence suggests that this variation cannot be easily explained based on
observables. For example, the CEOs with the largest and smallest homes in our sample are both
males, both in their mid- sixties, and are both CEOs of ﬁrms in the retail industry (in fact, their
ﬁrms have the same four-digit SIC codes). While there are several consumption-preference relations
which may potentially be revealed from our housing and mortgage data, we have so far attempted
to measure one speciﬁc personal preference which we believe is most relevant to corporate capital
structures: the CEO’s personal tolerance for debt. However, there is some emerging evidence that
CEOs’ purchases of large homes may signal CEO entrenchment. For example, Liu and Yermack
(2007) show that ﬁrm performance deteriorates when CEOs purchase large mansions and estates.
Table IX reports our baseline model speciﬁcation with home characteristics, in particular,
measures of the size of the home, included. In column (1), we include the log of the square footage
of the residence (LnSqFt), in column (2) the number of rooms (Rooms), and in column (3) the
log of the purchase price, in 2005 home price dollars (LnPurPr). In column (4), we include all of
these home characteristics. We ﬁnd that none of the home characteristics other than the CEO’s
personal debt ratio are signiﬁcantly related to corporate leverage.29 To the extent that home size is
a measure of managerial entrenchment, it does not seem to be related to the choice of corporate
leverage.
G Robustness Checks
We have performed a number of robustness checks. One concern is regarding the deﬁnition of
corporate leverage that we use. Table X therefore reports our baseline model speciﬁcation using
29We have also analyzed land size (the log of acreage) but it is insigniﬁcant and does not aﬀect HomeLev.
21alternative measures of corporate leverage. In column (1), we use total debt to book value of assets
(TDA). We ﬁnd that the estimated eﬀect is similar compared to the one using market values (13
percent compared to 20 percent). Other deﬁnitions of total corporate leverage have also been
proposed; in untabulated regressions we have examined several of them, e.g., assessing market
value as Assets – Book equity + Market equity.30 In column (2), we examine long-term debt to
total market value of assets (LDM). The coeﬃcient estimate is positive (0.0625) and statistically
signiﬁcant at the 1%-level. That is, a one standard deviation change in the home leverage measure
corresponds to about 21.7 percent change in long-term debt. In column (3), we ﬁnd that this result
is similar when using book values. Finally, we analyze the short-term portion of debt in the capital
structure. We ﬁnd no statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects of home leverage (untabulated). Thus, our
results are driven by variation in long-term debt ratios across ﬁrms.
Another concern is that the sample analyzed so far contains ﬁrms of very diﬀerent sizes, and
our results may only be relevant for a subsample of ﬁrms. Table XI therefore reports results for
size triciles, based on Assets for all U.S.-based, non-ﬁnancial, and non-utility ﬁrms covered by
ExecuComp in 2004. The average ﬁrm size for “Small,” “Medium,” and “Large” ﬁrms is $296
million, $1,178 million, and $16,242 million. We ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient estimates on HomeLev
are similar across the triciles: 0.0561, 0.0722, and 0.0646. Each of the coeﬃcients are statistically
signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. That is, the estimated eﬀect of personal leverage is similar across
ﬁrms of diﬀerent sizes.
We control for industry eﬀects, and because we examine S&P 1,500 ﬁrms, we do not have a
large subsample of “high-tech” ﬁrms. However, it may be argued that high-tech ﬁrms tend to have
very low leverage, and because they have likely gone public recently, the ﬁrm’s CEO may largely use
the proceeds from the sale of shares to ﬁnance his primary residence. In untabulated regressions,
we have checked that our results are robust to excluding ﬁrms that in 2004 have been available on
Compustat less than ﬁve years.
Finally, we note that there are certain advantages to having a principal residence in Florida
in case of personal bankruptcy or lawsuits because of state-speciﬁc constraints on ability to take
30We have data on mortgage interest rates for only a small subset of ﬁrms so we are not able to examine the relation
between personal and corporate interest coverage ratios.
22possession of someone’s primary residence. This may result in higher personal leverage in Florida
homes, but is unlikely to explain a relation with corporate leverage. In untabulated regressions, we
have checked that our results are robust to excluding CEOs with a primary residence in Florida.
IV CEO Changes and Corporate Leverage Changes
If a new CEO has diﬀerent personal leverage than the previous CEO, does the ﬁrm then change
corporate leverage? In this section, we analyze CEO changes and corporate leverage changes. We
start our analysis with the sample of CEOs for which we have data on HomeLev and have studied
so far in the paper. We then identify all CEO changes during the previous three years; we ﬁnd
149 CEO changes. We are able to ﬁnd primary residences for 108, or 72.5 percent, of the previous
CEOs, i.e., a comparable percentage to the one for our original sample (75.2 percent). We are able
to calculate home leverage for 89 of these CEOs (HomeLevPrev) after dropping eight observations
that involve new construction buildings and 11 observations with missing purchase price.
We refer to CEOs as “new” (i.e., CEOs in 2004) versus “previous” CEOs. For previous CEOs,
we calculate corporate leverage as of the last full year of the tenure of the CEO. For example, if the
previous CEO left oﬃce on June 15, 2002, then we associate the end of the year 2001 corporate
leverage with this CEO, as long as he was in oﬃce for all of 2001. For new CEOs, we calculate
corporate leverage for the ﬁrst full year that the CEO is in oﬃce. To continue with our example, if
the new CEO started his tenure on June 16, 2002, then the ﬁrst full year is 2003, as long as the
CEO was in oﬃce through the end of 2003. Thus, we compute corporate leverage associated with
the two diﬀerent CEOs two years apart in order to ensure that the ﬁrm capital structure choices we
analyze are in fact attributable to the two diﬀerent CEOs. We have data on current and previous
CEO home leverage for 89 ﬁrms, but for ﬁve of these observations the previous CEO’s tenure was
for less then one full calendar year, thus they are excluded from the changes analysis.31 This leaves
us with a sample of 84 CEO changes on which to perform our analysis.
31We have checked that our result of a positive relation between personal and corporate leverage is robust to
using the new, small subsample of 89 previous CEOs. The estimates coeﬃcient is 0.0973, using the baseline model
speciﬁcation in column (4) of Table V. The statistical signiﬁcance is weaker than in the full 2004 sample (t-statistic =
1.73), but this is likely because the sample is only about 15 percent of the 2004 sample size.
23Table XII shows summary statistics and regression results for the changes analysis. We deﬁne
HomeLevChg to be HomeLev −HomeLevPrev. Panel A shows that there are 39 observations for
which HomeLevChg > 0, i.e., the new CEO has more personal leverage than the previous CEO, 30
observations for which HomeLevChg < 0, and 15 observations for which there is no change (often
0 or 80 percent home leverage). We construct indicator variables for a personal leverage increase
(HomeLevIncr) and decrease (HomeLevDecr). As may be seen in the table, the mean (median)
increase in personal home leverage is 0.41 (0.35), while the mean (median) decrease is 0.36 (0.29).
We report two results from the changes analysis. First, in column (1) of Panel B, we regress
the new CEO’s home leverage on the previous CEO’s home leverage. We ﬁnd a positive (0.2319)
and statistically signiﬁcant, at the 5%-level, relation between the home leverage of the new and
previous CEOs. That is, if the previous CEO of a ﬁrm exhibited relatively low tolerance for ﬁnancial
leverage, then the new CEO also tends to exhibit low personal tolerance for ﬁnancial leverage. That
is, our evidence shows that a ﬁrm’s board tends to replace a conservative CEO with a new, similarly
conservative CEO. This ﬁnding suggests an endogenous CEO-ﬁrm matching explanation in which
ﬁrms persistently select CEOs with speciﬁc preferences for ﬁnancial risk-taking.
Second, in column (2), we regress changes in corporate leverage on HomeLevChg and changes
in the control variables. Also included are: TDM0, i.e., the corporate leverage in the last full year
of the tenure of the previous CEO, and year ﬁxed eﬀects. We ﬁnd that changes in HomeLev are
positively related to changes in corporate leverage, all else equal. The estimated coeﬃcient on
HomeLevChg is positive (0.0622) and statistically signiﬁcant at the 10%-level. The result of this
changes analysis is consistent with the positive relation found in the pure cross-sectional analysis for
2004, but in this case, the identiﬁcation comes from changes within ﬁrms. That is, ﬁrms appear to
change corporate leverage in a way that is, at least partially, predicted by the diﬀerence in personal
leverage between the new and previous CEOs. For example, if the new CEO is more conservative
than the previous CEO, we predict that the ﬁrm reduces its corporate leverage. Since corporate
leverage appears to change in two to three years around CEO turnover in the direction of the
personal leverage of the new CEO, the ﬁndings are suggestive of the ﬁrm selecting a CEO who will
execute a preset, desired, capital structure change.
24In column (3), we diﬀerentiate between CEO changes resulting in home leverage increases and
decreases and we ﬁnd asymmetric eﬀects. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that the estimated eﬀect on corporate
leverage of a change from a more to a less levered CEO is negative (-0.1152) and statistically
signiﬁcant at the 1%-level. That is, when the current CEO has less personal leverage than the
previous CEO, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant decrease in the ﬁrm’s corporate leverage. The median CEO
home leverage decrease is 0.29 in our sample, implying an estimated corporate leverage decrease of
3.3 percentage point in our sample. We ﬁnd no signiﬁcant eﬀect for CEO home leverage increases.
When ﬁrms hire a new CEO with a lower personal tolerance for ﬁnancial leverage than the previous
CEO, the ﬁrm tends to reduce its corporate leverage. Thus, reducing ﬁnancial risk is a stronger
eﬀect compared to increasing ﬁnancial leverage. After all, CEO turnovers are frequently motivated
by under performance (Warner et al., 1988); so that in our sample of ﬁrms with CEO turnovers the
ﬁrms are more likely to seek new CEOs that will lower corporate leverage to avoid ﬁnancial distress.
Finally, we note that the intercept in this model speciﬁcation absorbs the change in corporate
leverage when there is no personal leverage change between the new and previous CEOs. The
intercept is found to be close to zero (-0.0145) with a t-statistic of 0.30. That is, we ﬁnd no change
in corporate leverage when the new and previous CEOs have the same personal home leverage.32
V Why Are Personal and Corporate Leverage Positively Related?
So far our empirical analysis shows that there is a robust, positive, and statistically signiﬁcant
relation between CEOs’ personal leverage, as revealed in their most recent home purchases, and
the corporate leverage of the ﬁrms they manage. In this section, we oﬀer some evidence on why
personal and corporate leverage are positively related.
A Reverse Causality
It is possible that reverse causality can explain a relation between personal and corporate leverage.
However, based on our evidence, we believe that such reverse causality is unlikely for two reasons.
32We have also checked the robustness of these results to including a measure of changes in expected inﬂation using
data from the Livingston Survey, www.phil.frb.org/econ/liv/index.html. However, this variable is not statistically
signiﬁcant and it does not change the eﬀect of personal leverage (untabulated).
25First, we found in Section III.C that there is a signiﬁcant positive relation between personal and
corporate leverage even when HomeLev is measured several years earlier than corporate leverage.
This reduces concerns about reverse causality explaining our evidence.
Second, Table XIII reports separate regressions for home purchases before versus after the
executive becomes the CEO of the ﬁrm. In column (1), based on purchases before becoming CEO,
the coeﬃcient estimate is positive (0.0605) and statistically signiﬁcant at the 5%-level. This evidence
also reduces reverse causality concerns. In column (2), we report results for home purchases after the
CEO became CEO. In this case, the executive could have chosen a personal home leverage to oﬀset
the corporate leverage. However, we ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient estimate in the regression is still positive
(0.0843), and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1%-level. The ﬁnding that the relation between personal
and corporate leverage is similar after an executive becomes CEO also seems inconsistent with
reverse causality and the view that CEOs change their personal leverage to countervail corporate
leverage.
B Endogenous Matching of CEOs and Firms
Another explanation for the positive relation between personal and corporate leverage is endogenous
matching (sorting) of CEOs to ﬁrms. CEOs may diﬀer in their “match quality” with ﬁrms. In this
case, the positive relation is the result of optimal matching of CEOs with speciﬁc personal traits to
particular ﬁrms which seek and value precisely those characteristics in their CEO. Several of the
results so far oﬀer additional support for a matching explanation. For example, in Section IV, we
found that a ﬁrm’s board tends to replace a CEO with a conservative personal attitude towards
ﬁnancial leverage with a new, similarly conservative, CEO. That is, ﬁrms seem to persistently select
CEOs with speciﬁc preferences.33
A CEO-ﬁrm endogenous matching model is very diﬀerent from a standard model in which the
CEO is a homogenous input or in which CEOs’ personal traits otherwise do not matter. However,
ﬁrms and their boards spend considerable resources on screening and evaluating CEOs before
33We do not necessarily suggest that ﬁrms’ boards collect data on potential CEOs’ personal home leverage, but
that CEOs are selected based on personal traits which are broadly correlated with, e.g., ﬁnancial conservatism and
attitude towards debt and ﬁnancial leverage.
26selecting to hire them (e.g., Kaplan, Klebanov, and Sorensen (2008)). This is very surprising from
the perspective of a standard model and the question becomes: why do ﬁrms’ boards spend so
much resources on selecting a CEO based on their speciﬁc personal traits and characteristics? One
possible explanation is that potential CEO-ﬁrm pairs diﬀer signiﬁcantly in their “match quality,”
so that one CEO may be an optimal match for one ﬁrm but not another. The speciﬁc economic
mechanism may be that CEOs who have a higher propensity to bear ﬁnancial risk in equilibrium
match with ﬁrms that have higher leverage.
C Eﬀects of Corporate Governance
Poor governance structures among a subset of ﬁrms may cause such matching to not always be
optimal, and as a result there may be agency problems. We hypothesize that if CEOs imprint their
personal preferences on the capital structures of the ﬁrms they manage, governance may play an
important role. Speciﬁcally, it is in poorly governed ﬁrms where we expect CEOs to most easily
imprint their personal preferences. We therefore analyze whether diﬀerent corporate governance
structures result in diﬀerential eﬀects of personal leverage on corporate leverage.
Table XIV reports our results related to corporate governance eﬀects. First, we examine internal
governance and, in particular, incentive-based compensation. We ask if the eﬀect of personal leverage
is reduced when the CEO is compensated with relatively more incentive-based pay. We collect
data on CEOs’ compensation contracts from ExecuComp. We deﬁne IncentPay as the ratio of
CEO incentive compensation to total compensation in 2003. It is computed as the CEO’s total
compensation minus salary and deferred compensation divided by total compensation. In column (1),
we interact HomeLev with this incentive pay variable. We ﬁnd that the eﬀect of personal leverage
is signiﬁcantly reduced when the CEO’s incentive pay increases as a portion of total compensation.
The coeﬃcient estimate on the interaction variable is negative (-0.1821) with a t-statistic of 2.14.
Thus, it seems that CEOs who are not subject to strong incentive-based pay contracts are more
likely to imprint their personal preferences on the ﬁrms the manage. This result suggests that
incentive pay reduces an otherwise strong eﬀect of CEOs’ personal leverage on corporate leverage.
27Second, we analyze a measure of board governance: the size of the board.34 Smaller boards
may be more eﬃcient and thus preferred from a corporate governance perspective. We therefore
construct a measure of small board (SmallBoard), i.e., an indicator variable that is one if the
number of directors on the ﬁrm’s board is smaller than for the median (nine directors), and zero
otherwise. In column (2), we interact the CEO’s personal home leverage with this measure of board
governance. We ﬁnd that the interaction eﬀect involving the small board indicator is -0.0658 and
statistically signiﬁcant at the 10%-level, so the eﬀect of personal leverage on corporate leverage
is smaller when the ﬁrm’s board is smaller. This ﬁnding suggests that better board governance
reduces an eﬀect of CEOs’ personal leverage on corporate capital structures.
Finally, we examine the eﬀects of external governance. Speciﬁcally, we collect data from
RiskMetrics on the G-index by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003). We then construct a measure of
good external governance (GoodGov), i.e., an indicator variable that is one if the ﬁrm has a G-index
smaller than or equal to six, and zero otherwise.35 In column (3), we interact HomeLev with
this measure of good governance. We ﬁnd that the interaction eﬀect involving the good external
governance indicator is negative as predicted (-0.0235), but is not statistically signiﬁcant from zero.
36
We do not want to push our corporate governance results too far because of the crudeness of
the measures of good governance and because of the possible endogeneity of governance measures.
However, the results using incentive pay and board size as measures of governance, suggest that
CEOs may more easily imprint their personal preferences on their ﬁrms’ capital structures when
the ﬁrm they manage is poorly governed, measured in various ways. This result suggests that –
34Perhaps because of SOX and the new rules by NYSE and Nasdaq requiring boards of publicly traded ﬁrms to
have a majority of independent directors, we do not have suﬃcient variation in our 2004 sample to study board
independence as a corporate governance measure.
35We use a slightly diﬀerent cutoﬀ than Gompers et al. (2003). They use a G-index cutoﬀ of ﬁve in their paper to
deﬁne “Democracy” ﬁrms. We have very few such observations in our sample. However, 75 ﬁrms in our sample have a
G-index of six or less. We believe that our cutoﬀ still captures the most well-governed ﬁrms in our sample.
36Interestingly, the coeﬃcient on the GoodGov dummy variable is estimated at -0.0359 and is signiﬁcant at the
10%-level. This ﬁnding is indicative of one of the problems with using the G-index as a measure of governance: the
G-index identiﬁes young growth ﬁrms as good governance ﬁrms. But young growth ﬁrms are poor candidates for high
leverage. Our hypothesis regarding the eﬀect of external ﬁrm governance on the CEO’s ability to imprint his personal
preference is not supported by the use of the G-index from a statistical point of view. However, if the G-index is
not a measure of good governance, but rather a proxy for young growth ﬁrms, we ﬁnd that our results are robust to
controlling for young growth ﬁrms as evidenced by the positive and statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on HomeLev in
column (3).
28however important endogenous matching of CEOs to ﬁrms may be – matching may only be part of
the explanation behind the positive relation between personal leverage and corporate leverage.
D Corporate Valuation Eﬀects
The corporate governance results suggest that through imprinting their personal preferences some
CEOs may reduce the value of the ﬁrms they manage. Table XV examines this hypothesis by
regressing Q on the absolute deviation (AbsDev) computed in Section III.B. The variable Q is
deﬁned as 2004 Mktbk, as deﬁned as in the Appendix. Recall that AbsDev is the absolute value of
the diﬀerence between the predicted values from a standard corporate leverage model speciﬁcation
with and without HomeLev included. In column (1), we regress Q on AbsDev and a set of control
variables. We ﬁnd that the estimated coeﬃcient on Absdev is negative (-7.079) but not statistically
signiﬁcant. However, we also examine if there is a corporate valuation eﬀect among the ﬁrms
with the largest absolute deviations. We split the AbsDev distribution into quartiles, and deﬁne
AbsDevQ4 to be an indicator variable, which is one if the ﬁrm is in the quartile with the largest
absolute deviation. In column (2), we regress Q on AbsDevQ4 and the same set of controls as
in the ﬁrst column. The estimated coeﬃcient is negative (-0.255) and statistically signiﬁcant at
the 5%-level. That is, ﬁrms where the CEO imprints his personal preference on the ﬁrm’s capital
structure the most are found to have Q ratios that are 0.26 lower, all else equal. We note that the
economic magnitude of this eﬀect is sizeable because the mean (median) Q ratio in our sample is
1.794 (1.421). This evidence supports Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) argument that CEOs do not
always choose capital structures with a value-maximizing level of debt.37
VI Conclusion and Discussion
In this paper, we set out to analyze empirically the hypothesis that the speciﬁc personal traits
of CEOs may matter for corporate capital structure decisions. While many aspects of CEOs’
personalities and personal traits may potentially be of interest, we focus on one speciﬁc trait: a
37Other empirical evidence which suggests that agency has an eﬀect on corporate capital structures include Jung
et al. (1996) and Berger et al. (1997).
29CEO’s personal attitude towards ﬁnancial leverage and debt, as revealed by his most recent primary
residence purchase. We construct a database with detailed information on S&P 1,500 CEOs, their
home purchases, and mortgages. We ﬁnd signiﬁcant heterogeneity in personal leverage in the
cross-section of CEOs: the range is from 0 to 100 percent home leverage and the standard deviation
is 34 percent. Some CEOs are found to be much more comfortable with ﬁnancial leverage compared
to others, even when controlling for important economic determinants of home leverage, such as the
geographic region of the home or interest rates at the time of the purchase.
When we regress corporate leverage on personal leverage, we ﬁnd a positive and statistically
signiﬁcant relation. The economic magnitude of the estimated eﬀects is large. Suppose that we
compare two CEOs, one with the median personal leverage and one with a one standard deviation
lower mortgage to purchase price ratio. The diﬀerence in corporate leverage is about 2.4 percentage
points. Because the median (market-based) corporate leverage ratio is 12 percent in our sample,
this translates into a 20 percent lower corporate leverage. We also show that the presumably most
conservative CEOs, i.e., those who are found to “never lever” (at the time of the home purchase or
any other time), have 4.2 percentage points lower corporate leverage.
We ﬁnd support for two explanations for the positive relation between personal and corporate
leverage. First, we ﬁnd evidence for a sorting and endogenous matching of CEOs to ﬁrms. When
we regress a new CEO’s personal leverage on the previous CEO’s leverage, we ﬁnd a positive
and statistically signiﬁcant relation. While statistically signiﬁcant, the correlation is far from one,
meaning that sometimes ﬁrms select a new CEO with diﬀerent personal leverage than the previous
CEO. We regress changes in corporate leverage on changes in personal leverage and control variables
and ﬁnd a positive and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect. That is, ﬁrms change corporate leverage
in a way that is, in part, predicted by the diﬀerence in personal leverage between the new and
previous CEOs, so when the new CEO seems to be more ﬁnancially conservative based on his
personal leverage, the ﬁrm tends to reduce its corporate leverage. It is possible that the new CEO
was selected precisely to change the ﬁrm’s capital structure in this predicted direction. Second,
the positive relation between personal and corporate leverage may also be explained by CEOs
imprinting their personal preferences on the capital structures of the ﬁrms they manage, even if
30non-optimal from the perspective of ﬁrm value. We analyze three measures of governance (the
percentage incentive-based pay, board size, and the G-index) and ﬁnd that the positive relation
between CEOs’ personal leverage and corporate leverage is signiﬁcantly stronger in ﬁrms with
poor governance, when measured by incentive-based pay and board size. These results suggest
that endogenous matching of CEOs and ﬁrms is not the only explanation for the positive relation
between personal leverage and corporate leverage.
Our paper oﬀers several contributions to the existing corporate ﬁnance literature. First, we are
ﬁrst to measure a CEO’s personal and idiosyncratic attitude towards ﬁnancial leverage and to show
that a CEO’s attitude matters for corporate capital structure decisions. There has been a signiﬁcant
amount of discussion in previous work that this may be the case (e.g., Bertrand and Schoar (2003)
and Parsons and Titman (2007)), but we are not aware of any previous systematic empirical analysis.
Second, existing evidence suggests that when CEOs have more discretion over their ﬁrms’ capital
structures and are more poorly governed, they tend to prefer lower corporate leverage (e.g., Berger
et al. (1997)). However, our results show that there is signiﬁcant heterogeneity in the cross-section
of CEOs. Some CEOs prefer lower ﬁnancial leverage, but others have a high tolerance for debt,
both personally and in the ﬁrms they manage. That is, CEOs who are poorly governed may not
necessarily reduce corporate leverage; the CEO’s speciﬁc personal attitude towards ﬁnancial leverage
matters. Finally, we make a more general contribution to research in corporate ﬁnance. We are not
aware of any existing evidence ﬁnding that CEOs manage their ﬁrms in a very similar way as they
behave personally when it comes to ﬁnancial decision-making. For example, the CEOs who are the
most conservative in the ﬁnancing of their personal homes manage corporations which also choose
a very conservative capital structure, all else equal. As a result, CEO personalities and personal
traits can tell us important information about the ﬁnancial policies and behavior of the ﬁrms they
manage.
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34Appendix
Measures of Personal Leverage
The explanatory variable of particular interest in this paper is CEOs’ revealed tolerance for ﬁnancial
leverage. We construct several alternative measures:
• Home Leverage (HomeLev): is the sum of the primary and secondary mortgage liens, at
the time of the home purchase, divided by the purchase price. If the purchase price is not
available and there is no mortgage, then HomeLev is set to zero. If a mortgage is found but
if any one of the mortgage amount, purchase price, or the improvement cost (if the home is
new construction) is not available, then HomeLev is set to missing.
• Mortgage (Mort): an indicator variable that is one if the CEO uses a mortgage at the time
of the purchase of his primary residence, and zero otherwise.
• Mortgage or Reﬁnance (MortRefi): an indicator variable that is one if the CEO uses a
mortgage at the time of purchase or any other time, and zero otherwise.
• Never Lever (NeverLever): an indicator variable that is one if the CEO never used any
mortgage, revolving credit home equity lines/loans, or other forms of short-term debt home
ﬁnancing, and zero otherwise.
We hand-collect the data on CEOs’ mortgages using several data sources and following Liu and
Yermack (2007). We use mainly the Nexis online database of public records, www.nexis.com/research.
In this database, we are able to search tax assessment, deed transfer, and mortgage records for each
of the CEOs in our sample. In a select few cases, we have supplemented the data from Nexis by
searching various county assessor, auditor, and recorder websites.
Measures of Corporate Leverage
The corporate leverage measures used in this paper are:
• Total debt / market value of assets (TDM)
TDM is the ratio of total debt (item 34, debt in current liabilities + item 9, long-term debt)
to MVA, market value of assets. MVA is obtained as the sum of the market value of equity
(item 199, price-close × item 54, shares outstanding) + item 34, debt in current liabilities +
item 9, long-term debt + item 10, preferred-liquidation value, − item 35, deferred taxes and
investment tax credit.
• Total debt / assets (TDA)
TDA is the ratio of total debt (item 34, debt in current liabilities + item 9, long-term debt)
to item 6, assets.
• Long-term debt / market value of assets (LDM)
LDM is the ratio of Compustat item 9, long-term debt to MVA, market value of assets.
MVA is obtained as the sum of the market value of equity (item 199, price-close × item 54,
shares outstanding) + item 34, debt in current liabilities + item 9, long-term debt + item 10,
preferred-liquidation value, − item 35, deferred taxes and investment tax credit.
35• Long-term debt / assets (LDA)
LDA is the ratio of Compustat item 9, long-term debt to item 6, assets.
These data are from S&P’s Compustat database. All debt measures are computed as of the end of
the calendar year 2004.
Control Variables
The control variables used in this paper are:
• Market-to-book ratio (Mktbk)
Mktbk is the ratio of market value of assets (MVA) to Compustat item 6, assets. MVA is
obtained as the sum of the market value of equity (item 199, price-close × item 54, shares
outstanding) + item 34, debt in current liabilities + item 9, long-term debt + item 10,
preferred-liquidation value, − item 35, deferred taxes and investment tax credit.
• Log of Assets (Assets)
Assets is the log of Compustat item 6, assets.
• Proﬁtability (Profit)
Profit is the ratio of Compustat item 13, operating income before depreciation, to item 6,
assets.
• Tangibility (Tang)
Tang is the ratio of Compustat item 8, net property, plant and equipment, to item 6, assets.
• Log of Sales (Sales)
Sales is the log of Compustat item 12, sales.
• Collateral (Colltrl)
Colltrl is the ratio of (Compustat item 3, inventory + item 8, net PPE) to item 6, assets.
• Z-score (Zscore)
Zscore is the unleveraged Z-score. It is calculated as 3.3 × Compustat item 170, pretax income
+ item 12, sales + 1.4 × item 36, retained earnings + 1.2 × ((item 4, current assets - item 5,
current liabilities)/item 6, assets).
• Median industry leverage (IndustLev)
IndustLev is the median of total debt to market value of assets (TDM) by four-digit SIC code.
These data are from S&P’s Compustat database. All debt measures are computed as of the end of
the calendar year 2003, i.e., with a lag of one year compared to the corporate leverage measures.
36Table I:
CEO Home Characteristics
The table reports summary statistics for characteristics of primary residences of CEOs for a sample of
S&P 1,500 ﬁrms. Data on CEO home characteristics were collected primarily from the LexisNexis public
documents database, which includes national coverage of mortgage records, deed transfers, and tax assessor
records. The U.S. median data are tabulated from 2005 data provided by the Federal Housing Finance
Board – Periodic Summary Tables and the 2005 American Community Survey Subject Tables. Home
market values are from county tax assessor records (Tax) and from www.zillow.com (Zillow). Purchase
prices and market values are reported in 2005 home price dollars. Values are adjusted using the Oﬃce of
Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight’s National Home Price Index.
Panel A
MED MEAN STD MIN MAX N U.S. MED
Home size (sq ft) 5,180 5,649 2,800 785 22,371 600
Land size (acres) 1.1 3.5 10.0 0.1 140.0 565
Year Built 1989 1975 33 1740 2008 633 1975
Total Rooms 11.0 11.0 3.6 5.0 36.0 356
Bedrooms 4.0 4.5 1.4 0.0 16.0 479 5.0
Bathrooms 5.0 5.2 2.1 1.0 17.0 580 3.0
Purchase Price ($1,000s) 1,651 2,225 1,962 114 14,643 603
Mkt Value Tax ($1,000s) 1,480 2,070 2,807 65 43,578 652 168
Mkt Value Zillow ($1,000s) 1,679 2,333 2,564 104 39,143 626
Panel B
%N
New Construction 10.2 709
Live in Same State as Co 89.0 709
Live in Neighbor State of Co 5.6 709
37Table II:
CEO Home Financing
The table reports summary statistics for ﬁnancing of primary residences of CEOs for a sample of S&P
1,500 ﬁrms. In Panel A, HomeLev is determined at the time of the CEO home purchase, and is computed
as the mortgage divided by the purchase price of the home. If the purchase price is not available and
there is no mortgage, then HomeLev is set to zero. If a mortgage is found but if any one of the mortgage
amount, purchase price, or the improvement cost (if the home is new construction) is unavailable, then
HomeLev is set to missing. Statistics for HomeLev are for the unconditional sample, and for HomeLev
| Mort the reported sample statistics are conditional on the CEO using a mortgage to ﬁnance the home.
Mortgage Amount is the sum of the ﬁrst and second mortgages at the time of the CEO’s home purchase.
Panel B reports the percent of the sample and number of observations that use mortgage ﬁnance in the
purchase of their primary residence (Mortgage usage at purchase), that use either a mortgage at the time
of the purchase or debt ﬁnancing on their home at some point in time (Home leverage usage), for which
there is no public record that the CEO ever used debt (Never use leverage), and that uses a mortgage
with an adjustable rate contract. The U.S. median data are tabulated from 2005 data provided by the
Federal Housing Finance Board – Periodic Summary Tables and the 2005 American Community Survey
Subject Tables. Mortgage amounts are displayed in 2005 home price dollars. Values are adjusted using
the Oﬃce of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight’s National Home Price Index.
Panel A
MED MEAN STD MIN MAX N U.S. MED
HomeLev 0.48 0.41 0.34 0.00 1.00 570
HomeLev | Mort 0.66 0.63 0.20 0.01 1.00 368 0.75
Mortgage Amount ($1000s) 1,066 1,245 987 54 8,626 409 212
Panel B
%N
Mortgage usage at purchase 67.0 603
Home leverage usage 74.8 603
Never use leverage 20.7 603
38Table III:
Determinants of Personal Leverage
The table reports the coeﬃcients and standard errors from regressing HomeLev on determinants of personal leverage. The
sample is non-ﬁnancial S&P 1,500 ﬁrms. HomeLev is the ratio of mortgage value to purchase price used by the ﬁrm’s CEO in
his most recent primary home purchase. PurAgeis the age of the CEO at the time of his home purchase. LnMedHmV al is the
natural logarithm of the median home value in the county in which the CEO’s primary residence is located. County level median
home value data is obtained from the 2005 American Community Survey. MortRate30 is the prevailing 30-year conventional
ﬁxed mortgage rate in the month and year of the CEO’s home purchase. Data on monthly mortgage rates is obtained from
the Federal Reserve Economic Database series MORTG. MktRet5yr is the ﬁve-year annualized return of the value-weighted
CRSP index ending on the last day of December prior to the CEO’s home purchase. LnCashComp is the natural logarithm of
the total cash compensation (Execucomp data item TOTAL CURR) of the CEO in the year of the home purchase adjusted to
2005 dollars. This compensation includes salary plus bonuses. TaxIncRatio is the ratio of CEO compensation for which the
CEO cannot defer the tax liability. It is computed as the CEO’s salary plus bonus divided by total compensation in the year of
the home purchase (Execucomp items TOTAL CURR / TDC1). The table reports White (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent
standard errors, allowing for clustering at the industry-level. Signiﬁcance levels are denoted by *, **, ***, which correspond to
10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Intercept 0.4478*** -0.3643 0.6841*** 0.3734*** 0.2210 0.6772*** 0.4227***
(0.0899) (0.3280) (0.0520) (0.0252) (0.3509) (0.1290) (0.0309)
PurAge -0.0008 -0.0052***
(0.0018) (0.0018)










AdjR2 -0.001 0.008 0.032 0.003 0.076 0.007 -0.003
N 570 562 570 570 562 377 349
39Table IV:
Corporate Leverage and Control Variables
The table shows summary statistics for measures of corporate leverage (Panel A) and control variables
(Panel B) for a sample of S&P 1,500 ﬁrms. The corporate leverage variables are total debt to market
value of assets (TDM), total debt to book value of assets (TDA), long-term debt to market value of
assets (LDM), and long-term debt to book value of assets (LDA). The control variables are market to
book ratio (Mktbk), the log of total assets (Assets), proﬁtability (Profit), tangibility of assets (Tang),
and median industry leverage (IndusLev). Detailed deﬁnitions of all variables are found in the Appendix.
ExecuComp MEAN values are calculated from 1,351U.S.-based, non-ﬁnancial, and non-utility ﬁrms covered




MEAN STD 10th 50th 90th NM E A N
TDM 0.174 0.198 0.000 0.118 0.422 603 0.178
TDA 0.219 0.420 0.000 0.183 0.414 603 0.215
LDM 0.146 0.169 0.000 0.098 0.372 603 0.152
LDA 0.178 0.194 0.000 0.147 0.385 603 0.183
Panel B
Percentile ExecuComp
MEAN STD 10th 50th 90th NM E A N
Mktbk 1.796 1.246 0.715 1.462 3.139 602 1.796
Assets 7.096 1.613 5.158 6.917 9.371 603 7.140
Profit 0.114 0.141 0.005 0.123 0.241 601 0.112
Tang 0.246 0.186 0.050 0.200 0.524 603 0.268
IndusLev 0.152 0.153 0.004 0.096 0.367 603 0.166
40Table V:
Personal and Corporate Leverage
The table reports coeﬃcients and standard errors from regressing the total debt to market value of assets of the ﬁrm
in 2004 (TDM) on determinants of capital structure, using OLS estimation. Control variables are constructed using
2003 data and deﬁned as in Table IV. The sample is non-ﬁnancial S&P 1,500 ﬁrms. HomeLev is deﬁned as the ratio
of mortgage value to purchase price used by the ﬁrm’s CEO in his most recent primary home purchase. HL80 is a
dummy variable that equals one if HomeLev > 0.80, and zero otherwise. Column (6) includes ﬁxed eﬀects for the
state in which the ﬁrm is headquartered. The table reports White (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors,
allowing for clustering at the industry-level. Signiﬁcance levels are denoted by *, **, ***, which correspond to 10, 5,
and 1 percent levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept 0.1516*** -0.0067 0.0383*** -0.0193 -0.0206 0.1161
(0.0137) (0.0521) (0.0132) (0.0411) (0.0410) (0.1092)
HomeLev 0.0606** 0.0771*** 0.0629*** 0.0700*** 0.0632*** 0.0826***
(0.0249) (0.0213) (0.0213) (0.0198) (0.0214) (0.0207)
HL80 0.1104
(0.4307)
HL80 × HomeLev -0.0939
(0.4611)
Mktbk -0.0461*** -0.0280*** -0.0276*** -0.0254***
(0.0091) (0.0073) (0.0071) (0.0061)
Assets 0.0280*** 0.0198*** 0.0200*** 0.0193***
(0.0057) (0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0047)
Profit -0.2550*** -0.2683*** -0.2706*** -0.2772***
(0.0949) (0.0732) (0.0734) (0.0706)
Tang 0.2633*** 0.0792 0.0794 0.0578
(0.0742) (0.0554) (0.0556) (0.0562)
IndusLev 0.7338*** 0.5736*** 0.5749*** 0.5567***
(0.0809) (0.0805) (0.0807) (0.0810)
AdjR2 0.009 0.287 0.327 0.421 0.419 0.438
N 570 567 570 567 567 567
Fixed Eﬀects No No No No No State
41Table VI:
Eﬀects of Recent Home Purchases
The table reports coeﬃcients and standard errors from regressing diﬀerent measures of corporate leverage
computed in 2004 on determinants of capital structure, using OLS estimation. Control variables are
constructed using 2003 data and deﬁned as in Table IV. The sample is non-ﬁnancial S&P 1,500 ﬁrms.
HomeLev is deﬁned as the ratio of mortgage value to purchase price used by the ﬁrm’s CEO in his most
recent primary home purchase. Column (1) reports regression results using observations for which the
CEO’s home was purchased prior to 1999. Column (2) reports regression results using observations for
which the CEO’s home was purchased after 1998. The table reports White (1980) heteroscedasticity-
consistent standard errors, allowing for clustering at the industry-level. Signiﬁcance levels are denoted by
*, **, ***, which correspond to 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.



















Alternative Measures of Personal Leverage
The table reports coeﬃcients and standard errors from regressing the total debt to market value of assets
of the ﬁrm in 2004 (TDM) on determinants of capital structure, using OLS estimation. Control variables
are constructed using 2003 data and deﬁned as in Table IV. The sample is non-ﬁnancial S&P 1,500 ﬁrms.
Mort is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the CEO uses a mortgage to ﬁnance the purchase
of his home and takes a value of zero otherwise. MortRefi is an indicator variable that equals one if
there is evidence that the CEO uses a mortgage at the time of purchase or some time other than the
time of purchase for his primary residence, and zero otherwise. NeverLever is an indicator variable that
equals one if there is no public record that the CEO ever used debt, and zero otherwise. LnMortAmt
is the natural logarithm of the real value of the total mortgage amount used by the CEO in his most
recent home purchase. Real mortgage values are computed in 2005 home price dollars using the Oﬃce of
Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight’s National Home Price Index. HomeLevRes is the residual series
from regression (5) in Table III. The table reports White (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent standard
errors, allowing for clustering at the industry-level. Signiﬁcance levels are denoted by *, **, ***, which
correspond to 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Intercept 0.0095 0.0036 0.0462 -0.0067 0.0103











Mktbk -0.0292*** -0.0287*** -0.0285*** -0.0288*** -0.0276***
(0.0073) (0.0072) (0.0072) (0.0075) (0.0071)
Assets 0.0166*** 0.0163*** 0.0160*** 0.0181*** 0.0197***
(0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0049) (0.0050)
Profit -0.2716*** -0.2761*** -0.2764*** -0.2648*** -0.2717***
(0.0731) (0.0735) (0.0736) (0.0743) (0.0715)
Tang 0.0680 0.0705 0.0717 0.0803 0.0696
(0.0513) (0.0514) (0.0519) (0.0558) (0.0554)
IndusLev 0.5785*** 0.5822*** 0.5837*** 0.5788*** 0.5873***
(0.0764) (0.0765) (0.0768) (0.0797) (0.0821)
AdjR2 0.410 0.410 0.409 0.417 0.426
N 600 600 600 567 559
43Table VIII:
Eﬀects of Managerial Characteristics
The table reports coeﬃcients and standard errors from regressing the total debt to market value of assets
of the ﬁrm in 2004 (TDM) on determinants of capital structure, using OLS estimation. Control variables
are constructed using 2003 data and deﬁned as in Table IV. The sample is non-ﬁnancial S&P 1,500
ﬁrms. HomeLev is deﬁned as the ratio of mortgage value to purchase price used by the ﬁrm’s CEO in his
most recent primary home purchase. Age is the age of the CEO in 2004. Tenure is the number of years
the CEO held the CEO position as of 2004. Founder is an indicator variable equal to one if the CEO
is the founder of the company, and zero otherwise. The data on founder CEOs are from Fahlenbrach
(2008). PctOwn is the CEO’s percentage stake in the ﬁrm at end of the calendar year in 2003. Ownership
data are from Execucomp and total shares outstanding are from CRSP. The table reports White (1980)
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors, allowing for clustering at the industry-level. Signiﬁcance
levels are denoted by *, **, ***, which correspond to 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Intercept -0.0547 -0.0094 0.0844 -0.0030 -0.0040
(0.0659) (0.0418) (0.0576) (0.0379) (0.0609)
HomeLev 0.0721*** 0.0676*** 0.0814*** 0.0691*** 0.0673***









Mktbk -0.0280*** -0.0277*** -0.0300*** -0.0309*** -0.0307***
(0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0077) (0.0071) (0.0071)
Assets 0.0197*** 0.0192*** 0.0099 0.0180*** 0.0173***
(0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0062) (0.0050) (0.0050)
Profit -0.2692*** -0.2666*** -0.4682*** -0.1843*** -0.1818***
(0.0732) (0.0741) (0.1084) (0.0596) (0.0602)
Tang 0.0789 0.0798 0.1030 0.0677 0.0687
(0.0553) (0.0552) (0.0652) (0.0561) (0.0557)
IndusLev 0.5722*** 0.5716*** 0.4671*** 0.4988*** 0.4961***
(0.0803) (0.0800) (0.0888) (0.0784) (0.0782)
AdjR2 0.420 0.420 0.436 0.392 0.391
N 567 567 274 531 531
44Table IX:
Eﬀects of Home Characteristics
The table reports coeﬃcients and standard errors from regressing diﬀerent measures of corporate leverage
computed in 2004 on determinants of capital structure, using OLS estimation. Control variables are
constructed using 2003 data and deﬁned as in Table IV. The sample is non-ﬁnancial S&P 1,500 ﬁrms.
HomeLev is deﬁned as the ratio of mortgage value to purchase price used by the ﬁrm’s CEO in his most
recent primary home purchase. LnSqFt is the natural logarithm of the square footage of primary residence
of the ﬁrm’s CEO. Rooms is the number of rooms in the primary residence of the ﬁrm’s CEO. LnPurPr is
the natural logarithm of the real purchase price of the primary residence of the ﬁrm’s CEO. Real purchase
price values are computed in 2005 home price dollars using the Oﬃce of Federal Housing Enterprise
Oversight’s National Home Price Index. The table reports White (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent
standard errors, allowing for clustering at the industry-level. Signiﬁcance levels are denoted by *, **, ***,
which correspond to 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept -0.0462 -0.0270 -0.0103 -0.0970
(0.1176) (0.0539) (0.1008) (0.2230)
HomeLev 0.0807*** 0.0517** 0.0699*** 0.0509**







Mktbk -0.0289*** -0.0209** -0.0279*** -0.0207**
(0.0076) (0.0087) (0.0073) (0.0087)
Assets 0.0205*** 0.0206** 0.0199*** 0.0206**
(0.0055) (0.0080) (0.0049) (0.0084)
Profit -0.2659*** -0.3027*** -0.2686*** -0.3063***
(0.0757) (0.0822) (0.0731) (0.0820)
Tang 0.0756 0.0496 0.0790 0.0535
(0.0620) (0.0659) (0.0554) (0.0670)
IndusLev 0.5611*** 0.5790*** 0.5735*** 0.5736***
(0.0860) (0.1106) (0.0806) (0.1162)
AdjR2 0.421 0.385 0.420 0.372
N 484 289 567 284
45Table X:
Alternative Measures of Corporate Leverage
The table reports coeﬃcients and standard errors from regressing diﬀerent measures of corporate leverage
computed in 2004 on determinants of capital structure, using OLS estimation. Control variables are
constructed using 2003 data and deﬁned as in Table IV. The sample is non-ﬁnancial S&P 1,500 ﬁrms. The
corporate leverage variables are total debt to market value of assets (TDM), total debt to book value of
assets (TDA), long-term debt to market value of assets (LDM), and long-term debt to book value of assets
(LDA). HomeLev is deﬁned as the ratio of mortgage value to purchase price used by the ﬁrm’s CEO in
his most recent primary home purchase. The table reports White (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent
standard errors, allowing for clustering at the industry-level. Signiﬁcance levels are denoted by *, **, ***,
which correspond to 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
TDA LDM LDA
(1) (2) (3)
Intercept -0.1027 0.0010 0.0037
(0.1042) (0.0330) (0.0453)
HomeLev 0.0698** 0.0625*** 0.0641**
(0.0285) (0.0194) (0.0266)
Mktbk 0.0929 -0.0291*** 0.0076
(0.0688) (0.0056) (0.0104)
Assets 0.0212** 0.0150*** 0.0124**
(0.0089) (0.0039) (0.0056)
Profit -1.4539 -0.1169*** -0.1912**
(1.0270) (0.0351) (0.0942)
Tang 0.1719 0.0809 0.0861
(0.1093) (0.0495) (0.0529)
IndusLev 0.6542*** 0.3952*** 0.3176***
(0.2229) (0.0641) (0.0801)
AdjR2 0.234 0.343 0.105
N 567 567 567
46Table XI:
Eﬀect of Firm Size
The table reports coeﬃcients and standard errors from regressing the total debt to market value of assets
of the ﬁrm in 2004 (TDM) on determinants of capital structure, using OLS estimation for three diﬀerent
ﬁrm size categories. Size categories are based on triciles of ﬁrm assets created from the 1,351 U.S.-based,
non-ﬁnancial, and non-utility ﬁrms covered by Execucomp in 2004. Control variables are constructed
using 2003 data and deﬁned as in the Appendix. The sample is non-ﬁnancial S&P 1,500 ﬁrms. HomeLev
is deﬁned as the ratio of mortgage value to purchase price used by the ﬁrm’s CEO in his most recent
primary home purchase. The table reports White (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors,
allowing for clustering at the industry-level. Signiﬁcance levels are denoted by *, **, ***, which correspond
to 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
Small Medium Large
(1) (2) (3)
Intercept -0.0388 0.6118*** 0.1617
(0.1062) (0.1909) (0.1252)
HomeLev 0.0561** 0.0722** 0.0646**
(0.0257) (0.0325) (0.0324)
Mktbk -0.0086 -0.0264** -0.0550***
(0.0074) (0.0124) (0.0207)
Assets 0.0144 -0.0649** 0.0097
(0.0178) (0.0266) (0.0114)
Profit -0.2011** -0.2522** -0.7719***
(0.0781) (0.1144) (0.2820)
Tang 0.0467 -0.0539 0.2507**
(0.0617) (0.0600) (0.1035)
IndusLev 0.6484*** 0.5749*** 0.4353***
(0.1358) (0.1037) (0.1334)
AdjR2 0.329 0.386 0.471
N 202 181 184
47Table XII:
CEO Changes and Corporate Leverage Changes
Panel A of this table reports summary statistics for changes in CEO HomeLev for 84 S&P 1,500 non-
ﬁnancial ﬁrms. HomeLev is deﬁned as the ratio of mortgage value to purchase price used by the ﬁrm’s
CEO in his most recent primary home purchase and HomeLevPrev is the home leverage of the ﬁrm’s
previous CEO. Panel B reports regression results using the 84 sample ﬁrms for which changes in HomeLev
are calculated. Column (1) of Panel B reports coeﬃcients and standard errors from regressing HomeLev on
HomeLevPrev. Columns (2) and (3) of Panel B report coeﬃcients and standard errors from regressing the
change in the total debt to market value of assets of the ﬁrm (TDMChg) on changes in the determinants of
capital structure, using OLS estimation. Control variables are constructed using one-year lagged data and
are deﬁned as in the Appendix. HomeLevChg is deﬁned as HomeLev - HomeLevPrev. HomeLevDecr
is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the HomeLev of the incumbent CEO is less than the
HomeLev of the previous CEO. HomeLevIncr is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the
HomeLev of the incumbent CEO is greater than the HomeLev of the previous CEO. TDM0 is the
year-end TDM of the last full year of the previous CEO’s tenure. Columns (2) and (3) include ﬁxed eﬀects
for the ﬁrst year of tenure of the current CEO. The table reports White (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent
standard errors, allowing for clustering at the industry-level. Signiﬁcance levels are denoted by *, **, ***,
which correspond to 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
Panel A
MED MEAN STD MIN MAX N
Increases in HomeLev 0.35 0.41 0.27 0.03 0.95 39
No Change in HomeLev 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 15
Decreases in HomeLev -0.29 -0.36 0.25 -0.93 -0.06 30
Changes in HomeLev 0.00 0.06 0.42 -0.93 0.95 84
The table continues on the following page.
48The table continues from the previous page.
Panel B
Dependent Variable HomeLev TDMChg TDMChg
(1) (2) (3)






















AdjR2 0.056 0.094 0.168
N 84 83 83
Fixed Eﬀects No Time Time
49Table XIII:
Eﬀects of Home Purchase Timing
The table reports coeﬃcients and standard errors from regressing diﬀerent measures of corporate leverage
computed in 2004 on determinants of capital structure, using OLS estimation. Control variables are
constructed using 2003 data and deﬁned as in Table IV. The sample is non-ﬁnancial S&P 1,500 ﬁrms.
HomeLev is deﬁned as the ratio of mortgage value to purchase price used by the ﬁrm’s CEO in his
most recent primary home purchase. Column (1) reports regression results using observations for which
the CEO’s home was purchased prior to becoming CEO. Column (2) reports regression results using
observations for which the CEO’s home was purchased during or after becoming CEO. The table reports
White (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors, allowing for clustering at the industry-level.




















Eﬀects of Corporate Governance
The table reports coeﬃcients and standard errors from regressing diﬀerent measures of corporate leverage
computed in 2004 on determinants of capital structure, using OLS estimation. Control variables are
constructed using 2003 data and deﬁned as in Table IV. The sample is non-ﬁnancial S&P 1,500 ﬁrms.
HomeLev is deﬁned as the ratio of mortgage value to purchase price used by the ﬁrm’s CEO in his
most recent primary home purchase. IncentPay is the ratio of CEO incentive compensation to total
compensation in 2003. It is computed as the CEO’s total compensation minus salary and deferred
compensation divided by his total compensation (Execucomp items (TDC1 - SALARY - DEFER RPT
AS INC TOT)/TDC1). SmallBoard is an indicator variable that is one if the number of directors on the
ﬁrm’s board is smaller than for the median for the sample in 2004 (nine directors), and zero otherwise.
GoodGov is an indicator variable that equals one if the 2004 governance index of Gompers et al. (2003) is
less than or equal to six, and zero otherwise. The data on the governance index and board size are from
RiskMetrics. The table reports White (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors, allowing for
clustering at the industry-level. Signiﬁcance levels are denoted by *, **, ***, which correspond to 10, 5,
and 1 percent levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (2)
Intercept -0.0328 -0.0048 -0.0171
(0.0431) (0.0511) (0.0413)












HomeLev × GoodGov -0.0235
(0.0462)
Mktbk -0.0314*** -0.0269*** -0.0320***
(0.0073) (0.0078) (0.0081)
Assets 0.0206*** 0.0189*** 0.0214***
(0.0048) (0.0050) (0.0047)
Profit -0.2010*** -0.2739*** -0.2287***
(0.0621) (0.0785) (0.0853)
Tang 0.0587 0.0362 0.0797
(0.0551) (0.0494) (0.0587)
IndusLev 0.5526*** 0.5036*** 0.5172***
(0.0780) (0.0707) (0.0845)
AdjR2 0.407 0.456 0.440
N 542 458 499
51Table XV:
Corporate Valuation Eﬀects
The table reports coeﬃcients and standard errors from regressing ﬁrm value (Q) on various determinants
of ﬁrm value, using OLS estimation. Control variables are constructed using 2003 data and Q is deﬁned
as 2004 Mktbk as deﬁned in the appendix. AbsDev is the absolute value of the diﬀerence between the
predicted values from a standard corporate leverage model speciﬁcation with and without HomeLev
included. Figure I displays a histogram of this variable. AbsDevQ4 is an indicator variable which is one if
the ﬁrm is in the quartile with the largest absolute deviation. Assets is the natural logarithm of total
ﬁrm assets. EBIT is a measure of proﬁtability and is deﬁned as EBIT/Sales. CAPEX is a measure of
capital expenditures and is deﬁned as CAPEX/Sales. SPDum is a dummy variable that is one if the ﬁrm
was a member of the S&P 500 in 2004 and zero otherwise. Lev is 2003 TDM as deﬁned in the appendix.
IndusQ is the median Q value for the ﬁrm’s 4-digit SIC industry for the universe of Compustat ﬁrms.
The sample is non-ﬁnancial S&P 1,500 ﬁrms. The table reports White (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent
standard errors, allowing for clustering at the industry-level. Signiﬁcance levels are denoted by *, **, ***,



























































Absolute Deviations from Predicted Corporate Leverage
The ﬁgure shows the distribution of the absolute deviations from predicted corporate leverage
due to the CEO’s debt preference as measured by HomeLev, which is deﬁned as the ratio of
mortgage value to purchase price used by the ﬁrm’s CEO in his most recent primary home
purchase. Absolute deviations are computed as the absolute value of the diﬀerence between
the ﬁtted values from a regression of corporate leverage (TDM)o nMktbk, Assets, Profit,
Tang, and IndusLev, i.e., the baseline model speciﬁcation, column (4) in Table V. There are













































Ceo Home Purchase Timing
This ﬁgure shows the distribution, by purchase year, of the most recent home purchase for the
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